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 Why Lenity Has No Place in the Income Tax 
Laws 
Andy S. Grewal* 
In recent Terms, members of the Supreme Court have maintained an 
open attitude towards administrative deference doctrines.  Justices have re-
vived the “major questions” doctrine,1 have examined the possibility of over-
ruling Auer v. Robbins,2 and have even retreated from Chevron itself.3 
Any new Supreme Court limitations on administrative deference could 
affect the Internal Revenue Service’s rulemaking and interpretive authority, 
even if those limitations arise in non-tax cases.  Though it is often loathe to 
admit it, “[t]he IRS is not special,”4 and general administrative law deference 
principles extend to the tax area.5  However, there is one potentially evolving 
area of administrative deference, relating to the rule of lenity, for which the 
income tax laws should receive special treatment. 
Under the rule of lenity, courts generally resolve statutory ambiguities in 
favor of the criminal defendant.6  But under administrative deference doc-
trines, courts generally defer to an agency’s resolution of a statutory ambigui-
 
* Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.  I thank the Missouri Law Review 
for inviting me to participate in this Symposium. 
 1. See Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax 
Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 34 (in his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell, 
Chief Justice Roberts “crafts a new major questions doctrine that could significantly 
cut back on federal agency lawmaking authority”). 
 2. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I would therefore restore the balance originally struck by the APA with 
respect to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, not by rewriting the Act 
in order to make up for Auer, but by abandoning Auer and applying the Act as writ-
ten.”); Aaron Nielson, Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49 GA. L. REV. 
757, 791 (2015) (“Seminole Rock deference – the idea that agencies receive special 
deference when interpreting the regulations that they themselves write – may be on its 
last legs, at least according to statements of several of the Justices on the Supreme 
Court.”). 
 3. Gregory Patrick, Scholars Concerned About Chevron Deference ‘Retreat,’ 
U.S.L.W. (BNA) (June 3, 2016), http://www.bna.com/scholars-concerned-chevron-
n57982073856/. 
 4. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 5. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 
(2011). 
 6. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (the rule of lenity “ap-
plies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are 
left with an ambiguous statute”). 
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ty.7  These two principles clash when the violation of a given statute carries 
both civil and criminal consequences8 and an agency resolves an ambiguity in 
the “dual enforcement statute” in a way adverse to criminal defendants.  
When this happens, the court must decide whether it should defer to the 
agency or instead apply the rule of lenity.9 
Scholars have warned that active government prosecution against those 
involved in tax shelter transactions could bring this interpretive question to 
the income tax system, with unpredictable results.10  Tax shelters often stem 
from ambiguities in the tax code,11 and to determine whether a tax shelter 
works, a court must usually resolve those ambiguities.12  A taxpayer might 
argue that the court should use the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in 
his favor, over any IRS claim for deference. 
This Article shows that courts should reject such arguments because the 
rule of lenity has no place in the construction of the income tax provisions in 
Subtitle A of the tax code.13  The rule of lenity makes sense when applied to a 
 
 7. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 
407, 417 (1992) (“If the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some re-
spects, a degree of deference is granted to the agency . . . .”). 
 8. See Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 383 (4th Cir. 2012) (“In some instances, 
as here, the rule of lenity and Chevron point in opposite directions.  Deciding whether 
to apply the rule of lenity or whether to instead give deference to an agency interpre-
tation is no small task.”). 
 9. If a court believes that the level of ambiguity supporting agency deference is 
lower than the level of ambiguity needed to invoke the rule of lenity, it could avoid 
the interpretive conflict.  But it is inevitable that some statutes, as applied to some 
factual scenarios, will meet ambiguity thresholds for both agency deference and lenity 
principles.  See generally Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases, 66 
ADMIN. L. REV. 285 (2014). 
 10. See Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 
905, 941 (2007) (“[P]ursuing criminal penalties in tax shelter cases may represent the 
sort of scenario that could push the Court to expand its application of the rule of lenity 
in the civil context.”); Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the 
Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879, 903 (2007) 
(“Emerging developments such as the increased prominence of the rule of lenity . . . 
undoubtedly create a risk that courts will be marginally less likely to defer to the 
Treasury Department and the Service.”). 
 11. References to the tax code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended, I.R.C. (the “code”). 
 12. Sometimes, courts in the tax context skip statutory analysis altogether and 
announce that a transaction fails to pass muster under judge-made laws.  See, e.g., 
IRS v. CM Holdings (In re CM Holdings, Inc.), 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2002) (de-
scribing statutory provisions at issue but concluding that “[w]e can forgo examining 
the intersection of these statutory details”).  For criticism of this approach, see Aman-
deep Grewal, Economic Substance and the Supreme Court, 116 TAX NOTES 969 
(2007) (describing how lower courts’ creation of extra statutory tests conflicts with 
relevant Supreme Court precedents). 
 13. The tax code does not perfectly cabin off the income tax provisions from the 
procedural provisions, and parts of Subtitle A actually deal with matters other than the 
2
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statute that compels or prohibits some type of behavior, but income tax provi-
sions do not compel or prohibit anything.  Those provisions simply describe 
consequences associated with particular transactions.  Consequently, applying 
the rule of lenity can lead to anomalous results. 
If the Supreme Court considered how the rule of lenity applied in an in-
come tax case, it would likely recognize these anomalies.  But the Court takes 
few tax cases.14  If the Court addresses the relationship between the rule of 
lenity and agency deference doctrines, it will likely do so in a non-tax case.  
And if it holds that lenity trumps deference, it might use generic language 
suggesting that its holding applies to all agencies, including the IRS.  Tax-
payers and the IRS would then struggle to apply the Court’s holding, given 
the conceptual difficulties associated with applying the rule of lenity to the 
income tax provisions.  To avoid this problem, the Court should explicitly 
exempt income tax provisions from the rule of lenity. 
I.  THE RULE OF LENITY IN CIVIL CASES 
The Supreme Court has interpreted dual enforcement statutes on several 
occasions, though no opinion exhaustively addresses the interpretive difficul-
ties surrounding them.15  In one of the leading cases on the issues, United 
States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,16 the Court applied the rule of lenity 
but left unanswered some key questions.17  
Thompson/Center Arms involved a dispute over provisions of the Na-
tional Firearms Act.18  Under this Act, codified in the tax code, Congress 
established various pre-approval and registration requirements19 for firearm 
makers.  Through § 5281(a), it also imposed a $200 tax on the making of a  
determination of taxable income and tax liabilities.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1441 (West 
2016) (imposing withholding obligations on persons making payments to nonresident 
aliens).  For ease of exposition, this Article will refer to Subtitle A as measuring taxa-
ble income and determining tax liabilities and Subtitle F as dealing with procedure.  
See id. §§ 1–1564, 6001–7874.  But the function of any particular tax code provision 
must be determined by examining its language and not through mere reference to its 
grouping in one subtitle or another.  Also, though this Article focuses on the income 
tax laws, its analysis would extend to other tax regimes (like those relating to wealth 
transfer taxes) that contain both descriptive and prescriptive elements.  See, e.g., 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, JCX-52-15, HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS 
OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM (2015). 
 14. See Ryan Owens, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2012) (“In 1946, the Court decided 16 tax cases.  
In the 2008 Term, it decided none.”). 
 15. See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014) (Scalia, J., respecting 
the denial of certiorari) (summarizing Court precedents on dual enforcement statutes). 
 16. United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992) (plurality). 
 17. Id. at 525–26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 18. See id. at 507 (plurality opinion). 
 19. See I.R.C. § 5841 (2012) (imposing registration requirements); id. § 5822 
(requiring pre-approval of Treasury as condition of making a firearm). 
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“firearm,”20 which for purposes of the Act included short-barreled rifles but 
not long-barreled ones.21  Criminal sanctions potentially applied to a failure 
to satisfy the Act’s requirements,22 although Thompson/Center Arms involved 
a civil tax dispute.23 
The taxpayer in Thompson/Center Arms sold a package of gun compo-
nents that could be assembled into a short- or a long-barreled rifle, and an 
ambiguity arose over whether the taxpayer had made a firearm within the 
meaning of the Act.24  The taxpayer argued that it only made long-barreled 
rifles, if it made rifles at all,25 and should thus escape the § 5281(a) tax.  The 
government countered that the taxpayer’s packaging of gun components that 
might be assembled into a short-barreled rifle constituted the “making of a 
firearm.”26 
To determine whether the taxpayer had “ma[de] a firearm” under § 
5281(a), the Court first examined related provisions and the statute’s legisla-
tive history.27  However, after applying these “ordinary rules of statutory con-
struction,” it remained ambiguous whether the tax applied to the taxpayer.28  
The Court’s three-member plurality, along with two concurring Justices, ul-
timately concluded that the rule of lenity resolved the statutory ambiguity.29  
Although Thompson Center/Arms involved interpreting a tax statute in a civil 
setting, the Act had “criminal applications that carr[ied] no additional re-
quirement of willfulness.”30  This justified invocation of the lenity rule and a 
holding in the taxpayer’s favor.31 
 
 20. Id. § 5821(a). 
 21. Id. §§ 5845(a)(3)–(4) (“The term ‘firearm’ means . . . (3) a rifle having a 
barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (4) a weapon made from a rifle if 
such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or 
barrels of less than 16 inches in length . . . .”). 
 22. Id. § 5871 (“Any person who violates or fails to comply with any provisions 
of [the NFA] shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or be impris-
oned not more than ten years, or both.”) (I.R.C. §§ 5801–5872 is the National Fire-
arms Act). 
 23. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 517. 
 24. Id. at 508. 
 25. The taxpayer argued that it could not be treated as a maker of a firearm when 
it simply packaged components, but the plurality rejected that argument.  See id. at 
510. 
 26. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 5821 (“There shall be levied, collected, and paid 
upon the making of a firearm a tax at the rate of $200 for each firearm made.”) (em-
phasis added). 
 27. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 513–17. 
 28. Id. at 517. 
 29. Id. at 518.  See also id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I agree with the plu-
rality that the National Firearms Act . . . is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the rule 
of lenity . . . .”). 
 30. Id. at 517 (plurality opinion). 
 31. Id. at 518. 
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At first glance, it seems that Thompson Center/Arms definitively re-
solves interpretive questions surrounding dual enforcement statutes.  That is, 
a majority of Justices agreed that the rule of lenity applies to a statute backed 
by criminal enforcement mechanisms, even if the interpretive dispute arises 
in a purely civil proceeding.  This implies that the rule of lenity should al-
ways resolve ambiguities in dual enforcement statutes.  However, Thompson 
Center/Arms did not address whether agency deference doctrines could dis-
place the rule of lenity, because the government had not issued any guidance 
on the phrase “making a firearm.”32 
Had the government issued guidance under § 5281(a), a conflict would 
have arisen.  The rule of lenity resolves ambiguities in favor of defendants, 
but deference principles resolve ambiguities in favor of the government.  For 
example, had the government issued an interpretive rule stating that the as-
sembly of packages like Thompson Center/Arms qualified as the “making of a 
firearm,” it likely would have claimed so-called Skidmore deference, under 
which its interpretation would be “entitled to respect” to the extent that it had 
the “power to persuade.”33  Or, if the government had issued a legislative 
regulation, it likely would have claimed Chevron deference, which, shorn of 
nuance, blesses any agency view as long as it is reasonable.  If the Court ap-
plied either of these deference doctrines, rather than the rule of lenity, the 
government would have won. 
Later court cases provide no clear indication of whether agency defer-
ence doctrines trump lenity principles.34  Numerous circuit courts defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of dual enforcement statutes,35 but a concurring opin-
ion by Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit raises serious concerns about this 
practice.36  Those concerns have advanced an active debate on the issues.37 
 
 32. For a discussion of the mixed case law on whether the government obtains 
deference for interpretations advanced solely in litigation, see Bradley George Hub-
bard, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? 
The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 459–60 
(2013).  See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 782 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (declining to grant deference to IRS’s litigating position but noting that 
such deference may sometimes be appropriate). 
 33. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 34. See Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring).  See 
also Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing the majority erroneously believed the 
footnote in the Supreme Court opinion established primacy of Chevron over lenity 
rule for dual enforcement statutes). 
 35. See, e.g., Thompson/Ctr. Arms, 504 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 36. See Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 729 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(Sutton, J., concurring). 
 37. See generally Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 
58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 41 (2006) (discussing a few representative cases that illustrate 
some of the approaches courts have taken); Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule 
of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515 (2003). 
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II.  THE RULE OF LENITY AND INCOME TAX STATUTES 
For ambiguities in Subtitle A of the tax code, agency deference doc-
trines should always trump the rule of lenity because that rule has no place in 
the construction of income tax statutes.  To understand why this is so, first 
consider some hypothetical non-tax statutes that prohibit or require various 
behaviors.  These statutes might direct that no person shall travel in excess of 
a reasonable speed, that manufacturers cannot emit pollutants into the envi-
ronment, or that companies that sell stock must make financial disclosures. 
For each of these statutes, we can easily identify potential ambiguities, 
which, if resolved one way rather than the other, would necessarily favor 
defendants rather than the government.  With the traffic statute, for example, 
interpreting “reasonable” to incorporate a higher number rather than a lower 
number will favor the defendant; with the environmental statute, interpreting 
a narrower rather than broader definition of “pollutant” will also favor the 
defendant; and with the securities statute, a narrower rather than broader defi-
nition of “stock” would similarly favor the defendant.  In other words, for 
each statute, we can easily determine which way the rule of lenity would run 
because each prohibits or requires specific actions. 
But we cannot do that with Subtitle A of the tax code.  The income tax 
provisions, unlike the provisions at issue in Thompson/Center Arms, do not 
actually prohibit or require any type of behavior and instead attach conse-
quences to different actions.38  Section 162(c), for example, states that no 
deduction will be allowed for bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal payments.39  
However, this statute does not criminalize the payment of a bribe or kick-
back.  If a person makes such a payment, he will be prosecuted under the 
criminal laws, if at all. 
To establish that someone violated the tax laws, the government could 
not look to § 162(c).40  Rather, a taxpayer breaks the tax law only when vio-
lating some type of prohibition or requirement under the code.41  For exam-
ple, § 6012 (codified in Subtitle F) states that “returns with respect to income 
taxes under subtitle A shall be made by” the various persons subject to tax.42  
This provision actually requires the filing of a tax return that accurately re-
ports taxable income,43 and a failure to comply with § 6012, not § 162(c), 
 
 38. See I.R.C. §§ 7201–7217 (West 2016).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
 39. I.R.C. § 162(c). 
 40. Compare id., with I.R.C. §§ 7201–7217 (Chapter 75 of the Internal Revenue 
Code establishes when someone has violated the tax laws because it discusses crimes, 
other offenses, and forfeiture). 
 41. See I.R.C. §§ 7201–7217. 
 42. See id. §§ 6012(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 43. Ballantyne v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1523 (T.C. 2010) (“A taxpayer has 
a duty to file timely a complete and accurate return and to pay the amount shown as 
due on that return.”) (citing § 6012 and related statutes). 
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creates potential criminal tax consequences.44  And it is only statutes like § 
6012, which require specific actions, to which the rule of lenity can sensibly 
apply. 
To further illustrate this, consider a simple statute that offers nothing 
more than a definition of “fruit.”  Also suppose that it remains ambiguous 
whether the statute’s definition reaches tomatoes.  If a court were asked to 
determine the most lenient interpretation of this definitional statute, it would 
be helpless.  Whether including or excluding fruits reflects a lenient interpre-
tation would depend on the content of some other operative statute.  That is, 
if some operative statute made it a crime to import fruits, a lenient interpreta-
tion would exclude tomatoes from the definition.  But if the operative statute 
shielded the importation of fruits from criminal consequences (but criminal-
ized, for example, the importation of vegetables), then a lenient interpretation 
would include tomatoes in the definition.  And if some statutes accorded ad-
vantaged status to fruits and others accorded disadvantaged status to them, 
there would be no single lenient interpretation. 
When it comes to the income tax laws, a similar principle applies.  Most 
taxpayers might prefer to exclude an item from gross income under § 61, but 
other taxpayers might favor inclusion.45  Also, most taxpayers might prefer to 
immediately deduct expenses under § 162, but other taxpayers might prefer to 
capitalize those expenses.46  In other words, the income tax laws do not yield 
a single lenient interpretation – what might be good for one taxpayer might be 
bad for another.47 
A statute that figured heavily in the recent criminal tax shelter wave fur-
ther illustrates this.  Whether the so-called Bond Linked Issue Premium 
Structure (“BLIPS”) shelter generated the desired tax benefits depended, in 
large part, on § 752 of the tax code, which attaches consequences to partner-
 
 44. See I.R.C. § 7203.  Of course, it is not enough to simply file a return showing 
the taxes imposed.  Id.  Rather, taxpayers must pay such taxes, and a failure to pay 
may also trigger criminal consequences.  See id. § 7201. 
 45. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 36B, under which a taxpayer must meet an income floor if 
he wants to claim a premium assistance tax credit.  Regarding deductions for a dis-
cussion of some circumstances where a taxpayer might prefer to forgo a deduction 
and thereby increase taxable income, see James Edward Maule, No Thanks, Uncle 
Sam, You Can Keep Your Tax Break, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 81 (2006). 
 46. If a deduction would be available in the current year, when the taxpayer was 
in a low tax bracket, she might, depending on various things not relevant to the inter-
pretive issues discussed here, prefer to capitalize the expense and recognize a greater 
loss (or smaller gain) on the sale of property in a subsequent year in which she faces a 
higher tax rate. 
 47. See Martin D. Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the Judicial Process, 70 
ABA J. 74, 76 (1984) (“[E]very stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer will 
metamorphose sooner or later into a large green snake and bite the commissioner on 
the hind part.”). 
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partnership transactions involving “liabilities.”48  In a case decided in the 
1970s, Helmer v. Commissioner,49 the tax court held that contingent liabilities 
did not qualify as liabilities under § 752.50  This interpretation negatively 
affected the taxpayer, and the IRS won that dispute.51 
However, in the 1990s, some tax advisers realized that if § 752 did not 
reach contingent liabilities, they could create transactions that generated mas-
sive artificial losses.52  They consequently advised their clients to participate 
in the BLIPS transaction.53  The government, obviously upset with this, en-
gaged in massive enforcement efforts, collecting billions of dollars in civil 
penalties from taxpayers and pursuing criminal prosecutions against the ad-
visers who concocted BLIPS and similar transactions.54 
Though the criminal litigation over BLIPS has largely wrapped up, 
commentators had earlier suggested that the rule of lenity could influence a 
court’s interpretation of § 752 and, thus, the shelter’s validity.55  However, 
had a court done so, it would have erred.  As § 752’s history shows, there is 
no single defendant-friendly interpretation of the statute.56  If a court tried to 
apply the rule of lenity to BLIPS participants, it would hold that contingent 
liabilities fall outside of § 752.  But if it applied that holding to taxpayers 
situated like those in Helmer, its supposed rule of lenity would actually 
amount to a rule of severity. 
One might cleverly respond that, in applying the rule of lenity, a court 
could tilt the statute one way in cases involving BLIPS transactions and tilt it 
the other way in cases involving Helmer-type transactions.  However, the rule 
of lenity does not reflect a blunt, equitable tool intended to aid particular de-
 
 48. I.R.C. § 752.  For an overview of BLIPS transactions, see TANINA ROSTAIN 
& MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE 
TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY (2016). 
 49. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (T.C. 1975), superseded by regulation as stated in 
Cemco Inv’rs, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 753 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Courts actually expressed different opinions on the relevance of Helmer to 
tax shelters involving § 752.  See Markell Co. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1447, 
*39–40 (T.C. 2014) (describing different approaches).  Resolution of that controversy 
is not relevant to the interpretive issues discussed here.  Id. at *38. 
 53. Id. at *12. 
 54. See Andrew Countryman, IRS Collects $3.2 Billion from Users of Improper 
Tax Shelter, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-03-
25/business/0503250211_1_bad-shelter-irs-commissioner-mark-everson-irs-officials; 
IRS Collects $3.2 Billion from Son of Boss; Final Figure Should Top $3.5 Billion, 
IRS NEWSWIRE (Mar. 24, 2005), https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-collects-3-2-billion-
from-son-of-boss-final-figure-should-top-3-5-billion. 
 55. See Hickman, supra note 10, at 925.  See also Dean & Solan, supra note 10, 
at 903 (“Emerging developments such as the increased prominence of the rule of 
lenity . . . undoubtedly create a risk that courts will be marginally less likely to defer 
to the Treasury Department and the Service.”). 
 56. See I.R.C. § 752 (2012) (referring to cases in the citing references). 
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fendants in particular cases.  Rather, it is a canon of statutory construction 
intended to help determine the meaning of enacted language.57  And the 
meaning of a statute’s language cannot change, chameleon-like, depending on 
the identity of particular defendants.58 
To determine a single lenient interpretation of an income tax provision, 
a court might adopt whatever construction would favor most taxpayers, most 
of the time.  However, this approach would lead to strange results.  Suppose, 
for example, that it is ambiguous under § 302(b)(1) whether a particular type 
of distribution should be treated as a payment made in exchange for stock or 
should instead be treated as a dividend.59  Assume that most taxpayers, most 
of the time, prefer exchange treatment, and most taxpayers file their tax re-
turns accordingly.  However, some taxpayers take a cautious approach and 
report dividend treatment.60  Other taxpayers find that dividend treatment 
actually provides benefits, and they report that treatment not out of caution, 
but rather with the intent to evade taxes. 
If a criminal case arose involving the taxpayers who attempted to evade 
taxes by reporting dividend treatment, a court applying a general approach to 
the rule of lenity (an approach under which it adopts the interpretation that is 
favorable to most taxpayers, most of the time) would find that the statute 
mandated exchange treatment for the distribution at issue.  In doing so, the 
court would have used the rule of lenity to find for the government – a 
strange result.  Also, the cautious taxpayers who reported dividend treatment, 
without seeking any tax advantage, would be punished. 
The rule of lenity should not be used in this context.  If a statute affects 
different taxpayers differently, there will be no such thing as a universally 
favorable interpretation.  Agency deference doctrines and other principles of 
construction should apply to statutes like the income tax provisions, which 
impose no prohibitions or requirements. 
Arguably, in a future case involving a dual enforcement statute, the 
Court need not worry about the tax system and need not make any carve outs.  
Historically, administrative law pronouncements issued in non-tax cases have 
 
 57. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality). 
 58. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (applying the rule of lenity to 
the construction of an immigration statute in civil proceeding “[b]ecause we must 
interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or 
noncriminal context”). 
 59. See I.R.C. § 302(a) (contemplating that a corporation’s redemption of its 
stock may be treated as an exchange rather than a distribution under § 301).  See also 
id. § 302(b)(1) (stating that redemptions that are “not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend” come within § 302(a)). 
 60. A taxpayer could prefer exchange treatment when, for example, the exchange 
would give rise to long-term capital gain income and the rate applied to that income 
would be lower than that applied to dividend income.  See generally Comm’r v. 
Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 729–30 (1989).  However, corporate taxpayers do not enjoy a 
capital gains preference and would generally prefer dividend treatment, so as to enjoy 
the deduction on account of dividends received.  See I.R.C. § 243. 
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not disrupted or even necessarily had major effects on the tax laws.61  Conse-
quently, the tax laws might be insulated from any general Court holding on 
the rule of lenity and agency deference. 
However, in light of recent developments, the Court should take a cau-
tious approach.  Specifically, in Mayo v. United States, the Court declined to 
“carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only” when 
it decided that the Chevron doctrine displaced tax-specific deference doc-
trines.62  With that in mind, if the Court generally holds that the rule of lenity 
trumps agency deference doctrines, lower courts may improperly apply that 
holding in cases involving the IRS. 
Also, the law on the rule of lenity and the income tax provisions remains 
underdeveloped, which would amplify the effect of any general Court guid-
ance on the issues.  Criminal tax cases have historically involved egregious 
transactions that do not present challenging questions of income tax law, so 
courts have had few occasions to construe ambiguous income tax provisions 
in the criminal context.  And until recently, some courts cabined off criminal 
income tax cases from civil cases by holding that the meaning of a statute 
could change depending on the context.63 
If the Court offers a limited holding – that only regulations issued under 
notice-and-comment procedures trump the rule of lenity – it should nonethe-
less act cautiously.  The Court might reach that holding if it emphasizes the 
notice function of the rule of lenity and discounts the legislative function.  
That is, the rule of lenity helps ensure those subject to the law receive clear 
notice of the conduct that may lead to criminal sanctions (the notice function) 
and also encourages the legislature itself to clearly define criminal conduct 
(the legislative function).  Because agencies usually publish regulations in the 
Federal Register prior to their taking effect, those regulations might satisfy 
 
 61. Kristin E. Hickman, Goodbye Tax Exceptionalism, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Dec. 
1, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/goodbye-tax-exceptionalism (“In 
the past few decades, the practices and doctrines governing the interpretation and 
administration of the federal tax code have diverged somewhat from general adminis-
trative law doctrines and norms in several ways.”). 
 62. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 
(2011). 
 63. Under § 301, a distributee generally will not recognize income on a distribu-
tion with respect to stock owned in a corporation when that corporation lacks earnings 
of profits.  See I.R.C. § 301.  However, in the criminal context, some courts dismissed 
the relevance of earnings and profits and focused on the taxpayer’s intent, such that § 
301 essentially meant one thing in the civil context and another thing in the criminal 
context.  See United States v. Williams, 875 F.2d 846, 851 (11th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 1976) (explaining that § 301 essential-
ly meant one thing in the civil context and another thing in the criminal context), 
abrogated by Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421, 436 (2008) (stating that the 
distribution rules “draw no distinction in terms of criminal or civil consequence,” and 
that the Ninth Circuit’s approach “creates a disconnect between civil and criminal 
liability”). 
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the notice function, and the Court may conclude that Chevron trumps lenity 
for those regulations.64 
That holding, however, would create a dangerous negative inference, at 
least for the tax laws.  Under § 7805(b), many tax regulations operate retroac-
tively, back to the date of the enactment of the statute they interpret.65  If the 
Court holds that agency deference trumps lenity when an agency issues pro-
spective rules, that might imply that retroactive regulations are trumped by 
the rule of lenity.  However, for reasons already discussed, the rule of lenity 
should not apply to the construction of income tax provisions, whether or not 
any related regulations apply retroactively.66 
This does not mean that the rule of lenity has no place in the tax laws, 
and nothing here contradicts the holding of Thompson/Center Arms.  Unlike 
income tax statutes, § 5821(a) actually imposes requirements (anyone who 
undertakes “the making of a firearm” must pay a tax), and the rule of lenity 
sensibly applies to that provision.67  Also, many provisions of Subtitle F cre-
ate requirements for taxpayers (including obligations to file returns, pay tax-
es, and withhold on amounts transferred), and these provisions often are en-
forced by both civil and criminal measures.68  If the Court holds that lenity 
trumps agency deference doctrines for dual enforcement statutes, that holding 
should extend to ambiguities in these procedural provisions, though not to the 
income tax provisions. 
Putting conceptual problems aside, one might argue that without the rule 
of lenity, taxpayers who struggle to understand the tax code and who make 
honest interpretive mistakes might easily find themselves facing criminal 
prosecution.  However, as noted by the Supreme Court in Cheek v. United 
States,69 the tax code makes “specific intent to violate the law an element of 
certain federal criminal tax offenses,”70 and a defendant’s good faith miscon- 
 64. Lissa N. Snyders, When Does This Rule Go Into Effect?, FED. REG.: OFFICE 
FED. REG. BLOG (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/blog/2015/03/when-does-this-rule-go-into-effect. 
 65. Congress amended § 7805(b) and prohibited retroactive regulations for tax 
statutes enacted on or after July 30, 1996.  See I.R.C. § 7805.  However, “Under sec-
tion 7805(b) [as applied to prior statutes], there is a presumption that every regulation 
will operate retroactively, unless the Secretary specifies otherwise.”  UnionBanCal 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 309, 327 (T.C. 1999), aff’d, 305 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2002).  
For an argument that the § 7805(b) amendments apply to regulations issued under all 
tax statutes, regardless of date of enactment, see John Bunge, Statutory Protection 
From IRS Reinterpretation of Old Tax Laws, 144 TAX NOTES 1177 (2014). 
 66. Though the rule of lenity would not limit the government’s authority to issue 
retroactive regulations, such regulations could be challenged under an abuse of discre-
tion standard.  See generally Bryan T. Camp, The Retroactivity of Treasury Regula-
tions: Paths to Finding Abuse of Discretion, 7 VA. TAX REV. 509 (1988). 
 67. See I.R.C. § 5821(a). 
 68. See generally I.R.C. §§ 6001–7874. 
 69. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
 70. Id. at 199–200 (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of 
law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal sys-
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struction of an income tax provision provides a defense to criminal prosecu-
tions under statutory provisions carrying a willfulness requirement.71  For 
example, if a defendant misconstrues whether a particular item comes within 
gross income under § 61, he will be shielded from prosecution under § 7201, 
even if his good faith interpretation was completely wrong.72  In this way, 
criminal liability (as opposed to civil liability) does not necessarily turn on 
the meaning of income tax statutes, at least when Cheek applies.  Conse-
quently, as the Court’s plurality hinted in Thompson/Center Arms, the lenity 
rule may be unnecessary for prosecutions related to the income tax.73 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Symposium, A Future Without the Administrative State?, of which 
this Article is a part, allowed us to reconsider major aspects of our system of 
government.74  However, while we examine legislative proposals to funda-
mentally change the administrative state, we should not lose sight of the vari-
ous doctrines that the Court itself may reshape in coming Terms.  This Article 
strikes a note of caution – if the Court reconsiders longstanding deference 
doctrines, it should act cautiously to take into account special features of the 




tem. . . . Congress has . . . softened the impact of the common law presumption by 
making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax 
offenses.”). 
 71. Id. at 201–02. 
 72. See id. 
 73. United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517 (1992) (plu-
rality) (“The key to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that although it is a tax 
statute that we construe now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that 
carry no additional requirement of willfulness.”) (emphasis added). 
 74. Symposium, A Future Without The Administrative State?, 81 MO. L. REV. 
933 (2016). 
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